Opinion • February 29 2004

Ministers and votes

Karmenu Farrugia has some very innovative ideas to make about our electoral system…it is about time politicians pricked up their ears and listened…

To be properly governed this country needs a strong third party.” You would think it was someone from the AD to utter such a statement in front of a sizeable audience at a recent public seminar I attended. Would you believe it if I tell you it was one of Malta’s foremost and battle-hardened trade unionists? It was, indeed.
He argued that the voting pattern in all the nine general elections since Independence forty years ago always hurled the winning party to government with such a slender margin that inhibited most administrations from taking unpopular, yet necessary, decisions for fear of losing out on votes in the following election, even when this was still four years away, as is today. Instead of forward looking, ministers have appeared to continually look behind their shoulders so as to assess vote losses in practically every important move they felt like making: something they would probably refrain from doing if they were to govern in coalition. “I am being very daring in saying this,” he concluded, almost apologetically.
Certainly more daring was my own reaction which followed. Why should ministers necessarily have to be parliamentarians? Why couldn’t the prime minister appoint a few ‘outsiders’ to his cabinet, retaining political responsibility for their actions? Especially for portfolios where unpopular, but beneficial, decisions would cease being sacrificed at the altar of votes. Of course, the Constitution would need amending, but this should not be too difficult if the political will is there from both sides of the House.
Technocrats, for instance, would perform much better than randy politicians in a small nation like ours. How much of a choice does the premier have in picking a cabinet of fifteen from no more than 35 elected members? In Britain, where the choice is twelve times wider, ‘outsiders’ are occasionally appointed ministers. Here, why can’t five or six be the premier’s choice from outside the House, people with proven skills and administrative acumen? Not having to face the electorate, such people would not demur. Nor would they frequently be tempted to sex up their reports on the performance of their departments or, worse, on the state of the economy and its various sectors. As, sadly, is often the case.
Indeed, the electoral system itself needs overhauling for the better governance of the nation. Experience has uncovered some latent weaknesses in the manner we elect our members of parliament. Besides the virtual elimination of small parties (which, however, many believe to be a boon to political stability), the system attracts too many professionals for whom politics is just a part-time activity undertaken widely to bolster up their private practice rather than to be of service to the country.
Politics should be a career, not a side-line. Electors should be able to identify their representative in parliament, not any one of five as of today. This person must primarily look after the needs of the constituency, besides contributing to debates on national issues. There ought to be some others, mainly of ministerial material, who are free of constituency work and thus in a position to devote their full time to the country’s administration and problems.
I envisage a parliament consisting of thirty directly elected representatives, plus not more than twenty-five co-opted members. Malta would be divided into twenty-seven constituencies and Gozo three. Incorporating one, two or more local councils, the size of the constituency is of little import, since the principle of proportional representation would be strictly observed.
The elector would be given two ballot papers with only one choice in each: (i) the party and (ii) the individual. Nothing could be simpler. There is no reason why an elector should not vote for a party for its ideals and principles, and for an individual for his dedication, competence and integrity even if he/she does not belong to the same party.
Counting of votes could take place in the very same ballot room by the very same assistant commissioners immediately voting stops. Results could be available inside two hours or so. The electoral commission would afterwards, on a national basis, allocate to each party the proportionality of seats in the House in accordance with voting percentages won and to the nearest unit, but simultaneously ensuring that a party with over fifty percent preferences would have an overall majority of seats. This would require the addition of a number of co-opted members to make up the full strength of the House. The party with the lowest share would serve as the base on which to build up the proportionality.
Just to give an illustration (see chart).
One would normally expect the co-opted members of the winning party to form the bulk of the cabinet. Nothing, however, would stop an elected member from joining the cabinet, in which case one of the co-opted ones would take over the constituency’s representation.
So much intra-party antagonism between candidates would be spared. So much better for the electors to watch out as to whether their member does care enough for them and assist the local councils. And for ministers to act without the constant pressure of vote losing.